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Thunder Basin Coal Company v. Reich: District Courts
Stripped From Mine Act Review Scheme
Dear Sir,
I live 3 miles above Lorado. I'm writing you about a big
dam of water above us. The coal co. has dumped a big pile of
slate about 4 or 5 hundred feet high. The water behind it is about
400 feet deep and it is like a river. It is endangering our homes &
lives. There are over 20 families here & they own their homes.
Please send some one here to see the water & see how dangerous
it is. Every time it rains it scares every one to death. We are all
afraid we will be washed away & drowned. They just keep
dumping slate and slush in the water and making it more
dangerous every day.
Please let me hear from you at once and please for God's
sake have the dump and water destroyed. Our lives are in
danger'
In 1972, this "big pile of slate" collapsed, flooding a seventeen-
mile valley of coal mining towns below.2 On the day of the flood,
more than 125 people died, thousands more lost their homes, and the
West Virginia mine company that constructed the waste dam owed
more than $1.5 million in safety violation penalties3 The coal
company had maintained this deadly mine-waste dam in direct
violation of federal coal mine standards.4
Enacting current federal mining standards in the Mine Safety and
Health Amendments Act of 1977 (Mine Act),5 Congress declared that
the highest priority of the mining industry shall be the "health and
1. Letter from Pearl Woodrum to the Governor of West Virginia (Feb. 1968),
quoted in GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER: THE STORY OF THE
SURVIVORS' UNPRECEDENTED LAWSUIT 143 (1976).
2. STERN, supra note 1, at 3.
3. JOHN BRAiTHWAITE, To PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE
SAFETY 89 (1985).
4. STERN, supra note 1, at 147. The Pittston Company held all of the stock of the
Buffalo Mining Company, the West Virginia corporation responsible for constructing the
mine waste dam. Id. at 10. In the wake of the disaster, the Pittston Company claimed
that the flood was "an Act of God." Id. This declaration prompted a federal official
aware of the state's many coal mining tragedies to note, "God must be awful mean if he
picks on West Virginia all the time." Id. at 11.
5. Federal Mine Safety and Health Amendments Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164,91
Stat. 1290 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1988)).
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safety of its most precious resource-the miner."6 The United States
Supreme Court adhered to this purpose in Thunder Basin Coal Co.
v. Reich7 by preserving the Mine Act's unique role in the ad-
ministration and enforcement of mine safety standards! Under
previous mine safety laws, the availability of federal district court
review frequently delayed enforcement and perpetuated non-
compliance.' The Thunder Basin Court held that the Mine Act
excluded federal district courts from the judicial review scheme." The
Court not only protected the purpose and integrity of the Mine
Act," but it also vested the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review
Commission (Commission) 2 with the extraordinary authority to rule
on constitutional challenges to the Mine Act. 3
This Note first presents the background of the Court's decision
in Thunder Basin, describes the standard that the Court adopted, and
outlines the Court's reasoning.'4 Next, the Note examines the
mechanics of statutory review under the Mine Act and the divergent
lower court opinions that prompted the Court's decision."5 It then
analyzes Thunder Basin's impact on judicial review of administrative
action, especially with regard to constitutional issues.' 6 Finally, the
Note concludes that the Thunder Basin holding was inevitable and
suggests distinguishing features that may limit the applicability of the
case to other statutes.'7
Thunder Basin Coal Company (Thunder Basin), based in
Wyoming, employed approximately 500 nonunion workers in its
surface mining operation.'8 Pursuant to section 813(f) of the Mine
6. 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1988).
7. 114 S. Ct. 771 (1994). Robert Reich was the Secretary of Labor at the time.
8. Id at 778.
9. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (illustrating the result of non-
compliance at Buffalo Creek); see also infra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's concern that district court review would delay enforcement).
10. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 774.
11. Id. at 781 ("To uphold the District Court's jurisdiction in these circumstances
would be inimical to the structure and purpose of the Mine Act.").
12. Id. at 780. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission formulates
national policy as required by the Mine Act and reviews the legality of enforcement
actions taken by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to the Mine Act. 30 U.S.C. § 823 (1988).
13. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780.
14. See infra notes 18-71 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 72-140 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 141-70 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
18. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 775.
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Act, 9 the employees selected two individuals to serve as their
representatives during the federal government's physical inspections
of the mining operation. °  The appointed representatives were
members of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA), but
they were not employees of the Thunder Basin mine.2' In violation
of Mine Act requirements, Thunder Basin refused to post information
regarding the representatives.' Thunder Basin complained to the
district representative for the Mine Safety and Health Administration
(Mine Administration)' that the designation of union members as
representatives jeopardized its rights under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).24 In response, the Mine Administration's
District Manager gave written directive to Thunder Basin to post the
information.' Thunder Basin refused to comply and filed suit for
pre-enforcement injunctive relief in the United States District Court
for the District of Wyoming. 6  The company argued that the
representatives' UMWA membership violated its rights under the
19. 30 U.S.C. § 813(f) provides:
[A] representative of the operator and a representative authorized by his miners
shall be given an opportunity to accompany the Secretary or his authorized
representative during the physical inspection of any coal or other mine ... for
the purpose of aiding such inspection and to participate in pre- or post-inspection
conferences held at the mine.
20. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 775. A miners' representative is defined as "[a]ny
person or organization which represents two or more miners at a coal or other mine for
the purposes of the [Federal Mine Safety and Health] Act." 30 C.F.R. § 40.1(b)(1) (1993).
The Mine Act requires an annual minimum of four inspections for underground mines and
two inspections for surface mines. 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1988).
21. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 775; see also Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of
Labor, 897 F.2d 447, 452 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that representatives do not have to be
employees of the represented mine).
22. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 775. The required information includes the name and
address of the representative, the name and address of the mine operator where the
represented miners work, a statement that the representative is such for all purposes of
the Mine Act, and the names of alternates. 30 C.F.R. § 40.3 (1993). This information is
to be posted by the operator on the mine bulletin board. lI& § 40.4.
23. The Mine Safety and Health Administration (Mine Administration) is located
within the Department of Labor and headed by an Assistant Secretary of Labor for Mine
Safety and Health. 29 U.S.C. § 557(a) (1988). The Assistant Secretary is appointed by the
President and represents the Secretary of Labor in administering and enforcing the Mine
Act. Id.
24. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 775. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-
64 (1988); see also infra note 27 (discussing Thunder Basin's specific argument concerning
the NLRA).
25. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 775.
26. i&; Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Martin, No. 91-CV-0050-B (D. Wyo. 1992).
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NLRA. 7 Thunder Basin also claimed that the Mine Act's statutory
review process violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause,
maintaining that union members' access to its property, would
irreparably harm the mining operation.' The District Court granted
an injunction prohibiting the Secretary of Labor from enforcing the
access requirement on the grounds that Thunder Basin faced
irreparable harm.z9
Subsequently, the Secretary of Labor and the Mine Ad-
ministration appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals." The
Secretary sought to overturn the injunction by arguing that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief.31
The Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that "actions taken under the Act
should be challenged initially before the administrative agency in
accordance with the administrative review process outlined in 30
U.S.C. § 816. ,32 The court of appeals remanded the case and
instructed the district court to grant dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.33 Because the Tenth Circuit's judgment directly
conflicted with a prior Sixth Circuit decision upholding the district
court's jurisdiction in Mine Act procedural cases,' the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve the matter.3 5
27. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 775. Specifically, Thunder Basin argued that under
the NLRA the designation of union members as representatives for this nonunion mine
violated collective-bargaining principles and the company's right to exclude union or-
ganizers from its property. Id.
28. Id The company claimed it faced a constitutionally unbearable choice between
violating the posting requirement, risking heavy fines while its case was under review
pursuant to the statutory scheme, and giving union members detrimental access to its
operations by complying. Id.
29. Id. at 775-76.
30. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Martin, 969 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992), affd sub nom.,
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771 (1994).
31. Id. at 971.
32. Id. at 973. The Mine Act provides an administrative appeals process and grants
the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Mine
Commission. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
33. Id. at 977.
34. See Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Donovan, 774 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1985). The Sixth
Circuit reasoned that the Mine Act "does not expressly preclude" district court jurisdiction
and therefore upheld such jurisdiction for challenges to Mine Act procedures. Id. at 700.
35. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 776. Thunder Basin's petition for writ of certiorari
specifically stated that the Tenth Circuit decision was in direct conflict with both the Sixth
and Fourth Circuits. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Thunder Basin (No. 92-896). The
petition cited Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Secretary of Interior, 547 F.2d 240,242
(4th Cir. 1977), for the proposition that federal district courts are not precluded from
reviewing pre-enforcement challenges to administrative actions under the Mine Act.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Thunder Basin (No. 92-896). However, Bituminous
1988 [Vol. 73
MINE ACT REVIEW SCHEME
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Tenth Circuit's
decision.36 Justice Blackmun delivered the Court's opinion, holding
that "the statutory-review scheme in the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Amendments Act of 1977 prevents a district court from
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge
to the Act.""7  Following the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court
evaluated the Mine Act's judicial review provisions in light of the
standard set forth in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute,8 stating
that "[i]n cases involving delayed judicial review of final agency
actions... Congress has allocated initial review to an administrative
body where such intent is 'fairly discernible in the statutory
scheme.' "'I The Court's examination of the statutory scheme
involved the statute's purpose, language, structure, and legislative
history.4 An essential aspect of the Court's evaluation process was
"whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review."'"
Coal arose under the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Bituminous Coal,
547 F.2d at 243, not the Mine Act as amended in 1977. The Fourth Circuit upheld the
district court's federal question jurisdiction on this claim for injunctive and declaratory
relief, reasoning that "[b]ecause the Act neither states nor implies that § 816(a) furnishes
the exclusive procedure for obtaining judicial review, other procedures are not precluded."
Id.; cf. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1) (1988) (granting exclusive jurisdiction to courts of appeals).
36. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 771. Justice Scalia filed an opinion, with which Justice
Thomas joined, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Id. at 782-83 (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also infra notes 46, 64, 66-71,
and accompanying text.
37. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 774 (citations omitted).
38. 467 U.S. 340 (1984). Block presented the Court with the issue of "whether
ultimate consumers of dairy products may obtain judicial review of milk market orders
issued by the Secretary of Agriculture under the authority of the Agriculture Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937." Id. at 341. The Court held that consumers may not obtain
judicial review of the orders. Id. Oddly, the lower courts reviewed Block on the issue of
standing, but the Supreme Court characterized the issue as one of judicial review
preclusion. WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 250 (2d ed.
1992). A standing inquiry explores whether a particular plaintiff may bring an action. I&
However, as an entirely separate doctrine, "[p]reclusion deals with the issues in a case and
determines whether those issues are precluded either by statute or because they are
committed to agency discretion." Id.
39. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 776 (quoting Block, 467 U.S. at 351). "Whether and
to what extent a particular statute precludes judicial review is determined not only from
its express language, but also from the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its
legislative history, and the nature of the administrative action involved." Block, 467 U.S.
at 345. The Thunder Basin Court did not include the last factor, "the nature of the
administrative action involved," in listing the considerations to be weighed. Thunder
Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 776.
40. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 776 (citing Block, 467 U.S. at 345).
41. Id. (citing Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411 (1965)).
Without expressly mentioning "meaningful review," the Whitney Court noted that
Congress established a
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Applying Block's "fairly discernible" standard to the Mine Act's
review procedure, the Court determined that the review provisions for
post-enforcement challenges also apply to pre-enforcement challen-
ges.42 Justice Blackmun commenced the Court's opinion by reciting
the Mine Act's purpose of protecting the health and safety of
miners.' The Court reasoned that the Mine Act affords aggrieved
parties "a detailed structure for reviewing violations of 'any man-
datory health or safety standard, rule, order, or regulation promul-
gated' under the Act."'  Because the Mine Act is "facially silent"
regarding pre-enforcement claims, the Court determined that the
Mine Act's language, structure, and thorough review provisions
indicate congressional intent to preclude district court jurisdiction over
all claims, whether they are made before or after enforcement is
initiated.45
The Court buttressed its interpretation with an evaluation of the
Mine Act's legislative history.46 The Coal Act of 1969, administered
by the Department of Interior, preceded the Mine Act in establishing
and enforcing mine safety and health regulations.47 In enacting the
Mine Act, Congress transferred the administration and enforcement
responsibilities to the Department of Labor because of that
department's existing mandate to ensure safe and healthy working
carefully planned and comprehensive method for challenging [Federal Reserve]
Board determinations. That action by Congress was designed to permit an
agency, expert in banking matters, to explore and pass on [the issue at hand]. To
permit a district court to make the initial determination of a [bank holding
company] plan's propriety would substantially decrease the effectiveness of the
statutory design.
Whitney, 379 U.S. at 420. The Court stated that the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
provided for "a full administrative proceeding before the Board" and that the "Board's
determination is subject to judicial review by specified courts of appeals which must accept
the administrative findings if they are supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 417
(citations omitted). Addressing the adequacy of the review scheme, the Court stated, "We
think it is clear that the Court of Appeals can appropriately fashion an order." ld at 426.
42. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 776-77.
43. Id at 774 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 801(g) (1988)).
44. Id at 776 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1988)).
45. Id. at 780-81.
46. Id. at 777-79. Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, did not join the discussion
of the relevance of the Mine Act's legislative history. He rejected the discussion as
"unnecessary," stating that "[i]t serves to maintain the illusion that legislative history is an
important factor in this Court's deciding of cases, as opposed to an omnipresent make-
weight for decisions arrived at on other grounds." Id at 782 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
47. S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3401, 3405.
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conditions.48 The Mine Act's legislative history includes Congress's
recitation of numerous fatal mine disasters.49 The Court stated that
the prevalence of such disasters attributable to safety violations
"testified to the ineffectiveness of then-existing enforcement
measures" when "enforcement was hobbled by a cumbersome review
proces's."50 In particular, the Court noted Congress's apprehension
about the previous statutory scheme's grant to coal operators of de
novo review in federal district courts.5' The coal operators' ability
to seek district court review severely inhibited civil penalty collection
and thus delayed enforcement to the detriment of the mine workers'
safety." The Court concluded that Congress enacted the Mine Act
48. 1l Congress reasoned that
tragic disasters and the hundreds of deaths and serious injuries which occur in
our mine [sic] each year are testament to the inadequacies of our current mine
safety and health laws and their past enforcement by the Department of the
Interior. These recurrences signal a pressing need for legislative improvements
in our mine safety and health programs.
Id. at 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3404.
49. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 777. The Senate Human Resources Committee noted,
"our nation still experiences deaths and serious injuries in our mines at a rate which casts
shame on an advanced, industrialized society. Every working day of the year, at least one
miner is killed and sixty-six miners suffer disabling injuries in our nation's mines." S. REP.
No. 181, supra note 47, at 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3404.
50. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 777-78. According to the Senate Committee, "[m]ine
operators still find it cheaper to pay minimal civil penalties than to make the capital
investments necessary to adequately abate unsafe or unhealthy conditions, and there is still
no means by which the government can bring habitual and chronic violators of the law into
compliance." S. REP. No. 181, supra note 47, at 4, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3404.
See generally DANIEL J. CURRAN, DEAD LAWS FOR DEAD MEN: THE POLrIcs OF
FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY LEGISLATION 123-28 (1993) (detailing
problems with enforcing penalties against federal mining law violators).
51. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 778 n.15. The Committee commented:
This right to a de novo hearing before a jury in the District Court has had the
effect of encouraging operators to require enforcement of civil penalties in the
district courts, thus delaying still further the actual payment of the penalties
assessed. The resultant backlog of penalty cases has flooded the district courts
in the coal mining areas of the country, and the delay engendered has seriously
hampered the collection of civil penalties.
S. REP. NO. 181, supra note 47, at 45, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3445. But see
Laura E. Beverage, Litigation Under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act Today: A
Practical Guide, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 305, 306 (1992) (asserting that "[h]istorically,
only a small percentage of violations have been formally protested and litigated through
the full panoply of available review processes" and predicting a future of "increasingly
complex litigation" under the Mine Act).
52. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 778-79. In March of 1976, 23 miners and three
federal mine inspectors died during two successive explosions at the Scotia Mine in
Eastern Kentucky. S. REP. No. 181, supra note 47, at 41, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 3441. An accumulation of methane, a gas that occurs naturally in certain mining
operations, caused the Scotia explosions. Id. Adequate ventilation prevents the gas from
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to augment the Mine Administration's ability to enforce safety and
health standards and, in so doing, necessarily precluded federal district
court jurisdiction." The Mine Act's legislative history provided the
Court with "persuasive evidence that Congress intended to direct
ordinary challenges under the Mine Act to a single review process."54
The Court then explored "whether petitioner's claims [were] of
the type Congress intended to be reviewed within this statutory
structure.""5 This analysis rested on determining whether Thunder
Basin's claim received "meaningful judicial review."56  The Court
determined that Thunder Basin's statutory claim, alleging a conflict
with rights under the NLRA, was well within the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Review Commission's expertise. The Court conceded
accumulating to explosive levels of five to fifteen percent of the mine's atmosphere. Id.
Compliance with the federal requirement that mines have adequate ventilation is
paramount in preventing such disasters. Id. However, an investigation into the Scotia
disaster revealed that within the preceding 26 months the mine had been cited 62 times
for violations of the ventilation standards. Id. at 41-42, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3441-42. Oddly, during that period, the amounts of the penalties assessed actually
decreased rather than increased, contrary to federal requirements for habitual violators.
Id. at 42, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3442. The penalties that the Scotia Mine
operators settled with the Mine Administration averaged only $121.35 for each violation.
CtJRRAN, supra note 50, at 125. Daniel Curran summed up the problem:
Considering the size of Scotia's parent company, Blue Diamond Coal Company,
and the fact that it marketed coal worth more than $30 million in a year, the
penalty assessments represented a cost of less than 2 cents per ton. This amount
is easily absorbed during production and might be viewed as a mere cost of doing
business. Such small penalties do not deter.
Id.
53. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 782.
54. Id. at 778.
55. Id. at 779.
56. Id. at 776. The Thunder Basin Court did not explicitly define "meaningful
review." However, it cited two cases in which it previously held that district courts lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction under the relevant statutory act, reasoning that the available
court of appeals review was sufficient. Id. (citing Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.
v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32,37-42 (1991); Whitney Nat'l Bank v. New Orleans Bank,
379 U.S. 411,419-23 (1965)); see also supra note 41 (discussing Whitney); infra notes 157-59
and accompanying text (discussing MCorp).
57. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780. The Court declared that the Mine Commission
"was established as an independent-review body to 'develop a uniform and comprehensive
interpretation' of the Mine Act." Id. (citations omitted). As such, the Court concluded
that the Commission had ample experience adjudicating claims regarding "representatives"
under the Mine Act. Id. In support of this conclusion the Court cited Cyprus Empire
Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 10, 13-15 (1993) (considering whether
striking workers were permitted to have a representative during inspections), and Council
of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Martin County Coal Corp., 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 206, 208-15 (1984),
affd sub nom. Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 751 F.2d 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (considering whether a nonemployee miners'
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that the company's due process claim, as a constitutional issue,
commonly has been deemed to be outside administrative agency
jurisdiction5 8 However, the Court decided that "[t]his rule is not
mandatory... and is perhaps of less consequence where, as here, the
reviewing body is not the agency itself but an independent commis-
sion established exclusively to adjudicate Mine Act disputes." 9
Echoing the Tenth Circuit,' the Court insisted that the Commission
previously had demonstrated its willingness and ability to address
constitutional claims.6' Finally, the Court pointed out that under the
Mine Act's review scheme an aggrieved party may always seek
"meaningful review" in the courts of appeals.62
The Court stated that it "need not consider" Thunder Basin's due
process claim that it would suffer "serious and irreparable harm" if
forced to press its statutory claim before the Commission instead of
representative was permitted to monitor training courses at the mine). Thunder Basin, 114
S. Ct. at 780 n.17. Additionally, the Court noted that the Mine Commission had "recently
addressed the precise NLRA claims presented here," namely that allowing a nonemployee
union member to have mine access as a "representative" violates collective bargaining
principles. Id. at 780. The Court also noted that in Kerr-McGee Coal Corp. v. Secretary
of Labor, 15 F.M.S.H.R.C. 352, 361 (1993), "[t]he Commission concluded that there was
'no basis' for limiting the designation of miners' representatives to 'member[s] of a union
that also represents the miners for collective bargaining purposes under the NLRA.'" I&
at 780 n.18.
58. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780 (citing Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368
(1973) and, as in accord, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977)); see infra notes
121-26 and accompanying text (discussing Robison); infra note 93 (discussing Sanders).
59. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780.
60. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Martin, 969 F.2d 970, 974 (10th Cir. 1992), affd sub
nor. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771 (1994). The Tenth Circuit noted
that the Mine Act review scheme
does not limit the bases upon which a party may challenge a citation, order or
proposed assessment; the Act does not distinguish between challenges to orders
based on constitutional grounds or conflict with other statutes and challenges
based on misapplication of the Act itself. The Commission has demonstrated
that it will consider constitutional challenges to the Mine Act.
Id. (citations omitted); see also infra note 101 (listing cited cases).
61. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780. "The Commission has addressed constitutional
questions in previous enforcement proceedings. Even if this were not the case, however,
petitioner's statutory and constitutional claims here can be meaningfully addressed in the
court of appeals." Id. (citations omitted); see also infra notes notes 100-01 and
accompanying text (discussing similar holding by the Tenth Circuit and listing cases in
which the Mine Commission has decided constitutional claims).
62. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780. The Court distinguished Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749 (1974), stating that Thunder Basin "does not present the 'serious constitutional
question' that would arise if an agency statute were construed to preclude all judicial
review of a constitutional claim." Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780 n.20 (quoting
Weinberger, 422 U.S. at 762) (emphasis added).
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in district court.' However, the Court proceeded to evaluate the
due process claim despite its conclusion that such consideration was
unnecessary.'4  Concluding that neither compliance with, nor
continued violation of, the statute would cause "serious prehearing
deprivation," the Court found that Thunder Basin had sufficient
access to judicial review under the statute and, therefore, that its
situation did not present "a constitutionally intolerable choice." 65
Justice Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment,
but did not join the majority's opinion regarding the significance of
the Mine Act's legislative history66 or the conclusion that the Court
need not reach certain issues, including ripeness and exhaustion of
remedies.67 He also sought to clarify the Court's determination that
precluding pre-enforcement judicial review would not " 'subject
petitioner to a serious prehearing deprivation.' "I Justice Scalia
assumed the Court meant that "any such deprivation [would] be de
minimis," but he considered the potential deprivation more than de
minimis in this case.69 He further asserted that "preclusion of pre-
enforcement judicial review is constitutional whether or not
63. ld. at 781. The Court did not reach the merits of the case because it "resolved
th[e] dispute on statutory preclusion grounds." Id. at 782 n.23.
64. Id. at 781-82. In weighing Thunder Basin's due process claim, the Court essential-
ly provided guidance and legitimacy, albeit in dicta, for the Mine Commission to consider
similar claims in the future. The Court maintained that potential harm caused by union
member access to Thunder Basin's property would be limited and could be "remedied on
an individual basis under the Mine Act." Id. at 781. The Court also stated that no
prehearing deprivation (by monetary penalties) need result if Thunder Basin follows the
established review procedure, because penalties are not due until review is complete. Id.
at 781-82. The Court noted that the decision in this case rested solely on statutory
preclusion grounds, and therefore it did not need to address issues of final administrative
action, cause of action, ripeness, and exhaustion of remedies. Id. at 782 n.23. However,
Justice Scalia pointed out that these issues needed to be addressed regarding the due
process matter. Id. at 782. He admonished the Court to weigh the issues, stating that
"[t]he alleged impediments to entertaining that claim must be considered. It suffices here
to say that I do not consider them valid." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
65. Id. at 782.
66. See supra note 46.
67. See supra note 64.
68. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 782 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (quoting id. at 781).
69. Id. at 782-83 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). "I
know of no doctrine which lets stand unconstitutional injury that is more than de minims
but short of some other criterion of gravity." Id. at 782 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia noted that if the nonemployee union members
were allowed access to the mine property as "representatives" then they would necessarily
have access to "at least some confidential business information." Id. at 783 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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compliance produces irreparable harm-at least if a summary penalty
does not cause irreparable harm (e.g., if it is a recoverable summary
fine) or if judicial review is provided before a penalty for non-
compliance can be imposed."7 After noting that Mine Act non-
compliance penalties are judicially imposed, Justice Scalia stated that
he would have decided Thunder Basin's due process challenge "on the
simple grounds that the company can obtain judicial review if it
complies with the agency's request, and can obtain presanction
judicial review if it does not."'"
The Mine Act itself provided the Court with the primary basis for
its decision in Thunder Basin.2 The stated purpose of the Mine Act
is to establish mandatory health and safety standards in the mining
industry, ensure compliance with those standards, and identify ways
in which the federal government can cooperate with the states in
efforts to achieve those objectives.73 If a mine operator wishes to
challenge a citation, the Mine Act outlines the mechanisms for
reviewing administrative action.74 The Mine Act mandates that
review by the federal circuit courts of appeals is "the exclusive means
of challenging the validity of a mandatory health or safety stan-
dard."' The Mine Act also provides that any order issued by the
Commission may be challenged in the same manner.76  Any
70. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
71. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
72. See supra notes 43-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's interpretation
of the Mine Act's purpose, language, and structure).
73. 30 U.S.C. § 801(g) (1988). The Mine Act applies not only to coal mining, but to
other types of mining as well. "Coal or other mine" is defined in great detail at
§ 802(h)(1) (1988).
74. The statutory procedure permits review of violations of "any mandatory health or
safety standard, rule, order or regulation" established pursuant to the Mine Act. 30 U.S.C.
§ 814(a) (1988). A mine operator may seek Mine Commission review of a citation within
30 days of its issuance. Id. § 815(a). The Commission's order, issued after a hearing,
becomes final 30 days after its issuance. Id. § 815(d). An administrative law judge (ALT)
will review a challenge brought under the Mine Act, iU § 823(d)(1), and the Commission
adopts the ALJ's decision as final if it does not grant review within 40 days. Id. §
823(d)(1). The Mine Commission maintains discretion to review any case which raises a
"substantial question of law, policy or discretion." Id. § 823(d)(2)(A)(ii)(IV). See
generally Beverage, supra note 51 (providing an overview of the Mine Act's enforcement
scheme and the rights, duties and responsibilities of those regulated under the Mine Act
as a framework for litigation); James J. Gonzales, MSHA General Safety Standards:
Contesting the Citation, 18 COLO. LAW. 1105 (1989) (suggesting legal defenses for
contesting Mine Act citations).
75. 30 U.S.C. § 811(d) (1988).
76. 1aL § 816(a)(1). This section reads in pertinent part:
Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order of the Commission
issued under this chapter may obtain a review of such order in any United States
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judgment by a circuit court under the Mine Act is reviewable by the
United States Supreme Court." This review procedure applies to
any aggrieved party, including the Labor Secretary.' When a
challenge is made, the circuit court has the authority to "grant such
temporary relief as it deems appropriate pending final determination
of the proceeding."'79 The Mine Act expressly grants jurisdiction to
the federal district courts only when the Secretary of Labor seeks
injunctive relief"° or pursues civil penalty enforcement. 1
Thunder Basin afforded the Supreme Court an opportunity to
address two divergent interpretations of the Mine Act's statutory
review process. The conflict resolved by Thunder Basin arose in part
from the Sixth Circuit's decision in Southern Ohio Coal Co. v.
Donovan (SOCCO)' and the conflicting decision by the Tenth
Circuit in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Martin (Martin).83 SOCCO
consolidated on appeal two separate district court cases involving coal
operators who sought injunctive relief from Commission orders. 4
The merits of each case were settled, but the coal operators brought
the appeal against the Secretary of Labor on the constitutional claim
court of appeals for the circuit in which the violation is alleged to have occurred
or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit....
Upon such filing, the court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the proceeding and
of the questions determined therein, and shall have the power to make and enter
upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such record a decree
affirming, modifying, or setting aside, in whole or in part, the order of the




78. Id. § 816 (a)-(b).
79. Id. § 816(a)(2). Such relief is available if (1) all parties are given an opportunity
to be heard on the request for relief, (2) the petitioning party demonstrates "a substantial
likelihood that he will prevail on the merits of the final determination of the proceeding,"
and (3) "such relief will not adversely affect the health and safety of miners in the coal or
other mine." Id.
80. 30 U.S.C. § 818 (1988).
81. 30 U.S.C. § 8200) (1988).
82. 774 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1985), amended sub nom. Southern Ohio Coal Co. v.
Secretary of Labor, 781 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1986).
83. 969 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992), affd sub nom. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114
S. Ct. 771 (1994).
84. SOCCO, 774 F.2d at 695-96. The orders in question were based on 29 C.F.R.
§ 2700.44, under which the Secretary of Labor may require the automatic temporary
reinstatement of any miner who has sought enforcement of mine safety regulations and
has allegedly been dismissed as a result. SOCCO, 774 F.2d at 695.
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that the orders violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights.
8 5
The Sixth Circuit ruled that the district courts correctly exercised
jurisdiction in the cases below.86 The court stated three reasons for
rejecting the Secretary's argument that the Mine Act granted
exclusive jurisdiction to review Commission orders to the courts of
appeals.' First, it concluded that the district courts had jurisdiction
because the Mine Act "does not expressly preclude district court
jurisdiction."88 However, this conclusion conflicts with the general
administrative law principle that "[o]nce a court concludes that an
agency action is subject to circuit court review, it almost invariably
holds that circuit court jurisdiction is exclusive in order to avoid
potential confusion, conflict, and duplication of effort."8 9
Second, while noting that the purpose of a statutorily provided
review process is " 'to permit agency expertise to be brought to bear
on particular problems,' "90 the court contended that the due process
claims were beyond the agency's proficiency, as would be any
constitutional issues.9 1 The court conceded that "when the issue to
be adjudicated is one that is within the domain of agency expertise,
then the statutorily provided judicial review procedure is
exclusive." 92  However, repudiating the notion that constitutional
issues regarding a statute fall within the ambit of an administrative
agency's expertise, the court declared that the "responsibility to deal
85. SOCCO, 774 F.2d at 699. The operators based their procedural due process claim
on the "Secretary's refusal to give the mine operators any pre-deprivation hearing
whatsoever before granting temporary reinstatement." Id at 698. The Sixth Circuit
reviewed the case on the grounds that the regulation remained in place and thus
manifested "a reasonable expectation that the alleged wrongful and unconstitutional
deprivation may be repeated." Id at 699.
86. Id at 701.
87. Id at 700.
88. Id (emphasis added).
89. KENNETH CuLp DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 18.2, at 169 (3d ed. 1994). The Sixth Circuit apparently did not employ the
maxim of statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius that, if applied, would
deem the Mine Act's express grant of review to courts of appeals an indication of an intent
to deny a similar jurisdictional right to the district courts. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
581 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the phrase as "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another"). But cf. F. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 235 (1975) (contending that "this maxim is at best a description, after the fact,
of what the court has discovered from context").
90. SOCCO, 774 F.2d at 700 (quoting Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans,
379 U.S. 411, 420 (1965)).
91. Id
92. Id
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with questions of constitutional interpretation lies in the federal
courts, both at the trial and appellate levels."'93
The SOCCO court further established that, like the Supreme
Court,94 it had recognized a distinction between claims "under" a
statutory act-concerning its administration-that are appropriate for
administrative review and claims "to" a particular act-concerning its
constitutionality-that are appropriate for judicial review.95 The
court cited its recognition of this distinction in Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co. v. Donovan (L. & N.R. Co.),96 in which it noted in
dictum that "when Congress has specified a procedure for judicial
review of administrative action, courts will not make nonstatutory
remedies available without a showing of patent violation of agency
authority or manifest infringement of substantial rights irremediable
by the statutorily-prescribed method of review. ' In SOCCO, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed both district courts, finding "that the due
process challenges fell within the narrow circumstances alluded to in
the L. & N.R. Co. case."98
The Tenth Circuit took a contrary position regarding the Mine
Act's preclusion of district court review in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v.
Martin (Martin).99 In reaching conclusions counter to those of the
SOCCO Court, the Tenth Circuit adhered strictly to its precedent in
93. Id. The SOCCO Court based this conclusion on the Supreme Court's "distinction
between claims arising under an act and claims concerning the act itself." Id. (citing
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1977)). The court noted that in Sanders the
Supreme Court held that district courts did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to review
a challenge arising under the Social Security Act. Id. In relying on Sanders, the SOCCO
court explained that the Supreme Court in that case distinguished Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976), and Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), because " 'in both
instances.., the claimants challenged the Secretary's decisions on constitutional grounds.
Constitutional questions obviously are unsuited to resolution in administrative hearing
procedures and, therefore, access to the courts is essential to the decision of such
questions.' " SOCCO, 774 F.2d at 700 (quoting Sanders, 430 U.S. at 108-09).
94. See supra note 93 (describing the Supreme Court's distinction between statutory
claims and constitutional claims).
95. SOCCO, 774 F.2d at 700.
96. 713 F.2d 1243,1246 (6th Cir. 1983). In L. & N.R. Co., the court held that a district
court did not have jurisdiction in a case involving the extension of the Black Lung Benefits
Act to cover railroad workers. Id. at 1245.
97. SOCCO, 774 F.2d at 700-01 (quoting L. & N.R. Co., 713 F.2d at 1247) (internal
quotations omitted).
98. Id. at 701. In the district court cases consolidated in SOCCO, the "narrow
circumstances" on which the courts based their jurisdiction included the conclusion that
the agency had exceeded its authority in one case, id. at 697, and that the agency had
violated the petitioner's procedural due process rights in the other, id. at 699.
99. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Martin, 969 F.2d 970 (10th Cir. 1992), aff'd sub nor.
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771 (1994).
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American Coal Co. v. United States Department of Labor, Mine Safety
& Health Administration"° (American Coal) by holding that district
courts maintain only the limited jurisdiction provided in the Mine
Act.10' In American Coal, the Tenth Circuit held that the Mine
Act's failure to expressly grant district court jurisdiction, together with
its legislative history, "indicatef quite clearly that action ... is
initially subject to review within the administrative agency, with final
orders subject to review by Courts of Appeals."' '  The court in
American Coal stated that statutory preclusion of district court review
"may be implied by the context of an entire legislative scheme and
that clear and convincing evidence of a legislative intent that district
courts should not exercise jiirisdiction over particular matters is
sufficient to bar such jurisdiction, especially where other avenues of
review are available."'"
In Martin, the Tenth Circuit employed American Coal to
construct a standard for evaluating judicial review preclusion.'04
According to this standard, adopted from Block,'05 " 'to what extent
a particular statute precludes judicial review is determined not only
from its express language, but also from the structure of the statutory
scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the nature of the ad-
ministrative action involved.' "'06 The court held that the Mine Act
precluded district court review on the basis of "Congress' [sic] clear
100. 639 F.2d 659,662 (10th Cir. 1981). American Coal involved a Mine Administration
order requiring the partial and temporary closure of the company's Wilberg mine in Utah.
Ia at 659. The closure was ordered after a mine tunnel roof collapsed, and the area was
to remain closed until the company's roof control plan could be reevaluated. Id. at 659-60.
The American Coal Company brought an immediate action in district court challenging
the order. Id. at 660. The district court granted the Department of Labor's motion (on
behalf of the Mine Administration) to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed this dismissal because the statutory language grants to courts
of appeals the authority for judicial review. Id. at 660-61.
101. Martin, 969 F.2d at 973 (citing as in accord Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v.
Donovan, 516 F. Supp. 955, 959 (D.D.C. 1981); United States Steel Corp. v. Marshall, 471
F. Supp. 438, 439 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Marshall, 82
F.R.D. 350, 352-54 (D.D.C. 1979)).
102. American Coal, 639 F2d at 661-62.
103. Idt at 662.
104. Martin, 969 F.2d at 972-74.
105. See supra note 38.
106. Martin, 969 F.2d at 972 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340,
345 (1984)); see also supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court's adoption of the Block standard in Thunder Basin).
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intent as evidenced by both the plain language of the Mine Act as a
whole and the Act's legislative history."' 7
The Martin court noted that its decision in American Coal
rebutted the Sixth Circuit's assertion in SOCCO that the Mine Act
does not expressly exclude district courts from the review process."08
The Tenth Circuit countered the Sixth Circuit's second ar-
gument-that constitutional questions are outside the Mine Ad-
ministration's exper'ise° 9-- with the contention that the agency had
indeed "demonstrated that it will consider constitutional challenges to
the Mine Act."'  In response to the Sixth Circuit's distinction
between claims under an act and claims against the act itself,"' the
Tenth Circuit explained that the Mine Act does not make such a
distinction in the review procedure and "does not limit the bases upon
which a party may challenge a citation, order or proposed as-
sessment.""
n2
107. Martin, 969 F.2d at 973 (citing American Coal, 639 F.2d at 660). The court
recognized, as the legislative history suggests, that the Mine Act established a review
procedure that would significantly reduce and possibly eliminate enforcement delays
caused partly by the availability of district court review under prior regulatory schemes.
Id. at 974-75; see also supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (describing the Thunder
Basin Court's discussion of how district court review can contribute to enforcement
delays).
108. Id. at 974. The Sixth Circuit stated in SOCCO that although the Mine Act grants
review to circuit courts, it does not expressly preclude district court jurisdiction. SOCCO,
774 F.2d 693, 700 (1985); see also supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text (discussing the
Sixth Circuit's argument). In American Coal, the Tenth Circuit found that the Mine Act's
legislative history suggested that initial review rests with the agency. American Coal, 639
F.2d at 661. Concomitantly, that court found the absence of an explicit district court
exclusion from the review scheme to be inconclusive. Id.
109. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text (describing the Sixth Circuit's
conclusion in SOCCO that authority to adjudicate constitutional claims rests exclusively
with the federal courts).
110. Martin, 969 F.2d at 974 (citing Secretary of Labor, MSHA v. Alabama By-Products
Corp., 4 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2128, 2129 (1982); Secretary of Labor, MSHA v. Richardson, 3
F.M.S.H.R.C. 8, 18-21 (1981), aff'd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1982)). The
court made no effort to explain the Commission's authority for adjudicating the
constitutional challenges to the Mine Act. It only noted that the Commission had indeed
decided similar claims in the past and cited instances of such decisions. Id. As the Tenth
Circuit did in this case below, the Thunder Basin Court apparently assumed the validity
of the Commission's adjudication of constitutional claims without providing a source for
that exceptional authority. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's similarly limited treatment of the Commission's authority to adjudicate
constitutional claims).
111. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (describing the Sixth Circuit's
distinction in SOCCO between claims concerning the administration of an act and those
concerning the act's constitutionality).
112. Martin, 969 F.2d at 974.
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The Tenth Circuit's decision in Martin dissolved any distinction
between pre-enforcement and post-enforcement challenges under the
Mine Act."' The court explained that "[o]perators may not avoid
the Mine Act's administrative review process simply by filing in a
district court before actually receiving an anticipated citation order,
or assessment of penalty."" 4  Further, the Martin court ack-
nowledged that
[p]ermitting district court jurisdiction on the basis of claims
of constitutional violations or conflict with other statutes
would permit preemptive strikes that could seriously hamper
effective enforcement of the Act, disrupting the review
scheme Congress intended. Challenges to regulations and
provisions under the Mine Act are easily characterized in
constitutional terms and as conflicting with other
statutes.115
Specifically, the Tenth Circuit in Martin addressed Thunder
Basin's claim that the Mine Act's review scheme violated its Fifth
Amendment due process rights.116 This claim was premised on the
possibility that the aggrieved party may be subject to civil or criminal
113. Id. at 975. The Court cited for comparison Southern Pines Assocs. v. United
States, 912 F.2d 713, 716 (4th Cir. 1990) (prohibiting pre-enforcement challenges to EPA
action pursuant to the Clean Water Act), and Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 593 F.2d 299,304-
05 (8th Cir.) (prohibiting pre-enforcement challenges to EPA action under the Clean Air
Act), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 839 (1979). Martin, 969 F.2d at 975. The Clean Water Act of
1977, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1387 (1988), provides that "[r]eview of Administrator's action[s
under this title] ... may be had by any interested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals
of the United States for the Federal judicial district in which such person resides or
transacts business which is directly affected by such action upon application by such
person." Id. § 1369(b)(1). Similarly, the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392
(1963) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), authorizes
judicial review of EPA action in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in most
cases, but review regarding state implementation plans may be filed in U.S. courts of
appeals "for the appropriate circuit[s]." 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The
Clean Air Act further provides that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to
authorize judicial review of regulations or orders of the Administrator under this chapter,
except as provided in this section." Id. § 7607(e). Such an express exclusivity clause
ensures an easier determination of congressional intent regarding the extent of the
statutory preclusion of judicial review.
114. Martin, 969 F.2d at 975.
115. Id, (citing Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 897 F.2d 447, 452 (10th
Cir. 1990) (alleging that coal operator's property rights are infringed if nonemployees are
permitted inspection rights under Mine Act); United States Steel Corp. v. Marshall, 471
F. Supp. 438,439 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (alleging that complaint concerning the Mine Act arose
under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments); Bituminous Coal Operators'
Ass'n v. Marshall, 82 F.R.D. 350, 352 (D.D.C. 1979) (alleging that an "interpretive
bulletin" published by the Mine Administration was unconstitutional)).
116. Id. at 975-76.
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penalties for noncompliance before the disposition of its claim under
the Mine Act's review procedure." 7 The court perceived the Mine
Act's provisions regarding the imposition of penalties as adequate to
prevent the complaining party from suffering irreparable financial
harm."' Therefore, the court concluded that "the review provided
for by Congress is adequate and exclusive.""' 9
Precedent holds that constitutional questions concerning
administrative action should be decided in a judicial, not an ad-
ministrative, forum."2L In Johnson v. Robison,' for example,
Robison, a conscientious objector, brought an action against the
Veterans' Administration after it denied him educational assis-
tance."z Robison challenged the Administration's interpretation of
the applicable statutory provisions."z In light of having completed
two years of alternative civilian service, Robison alleged that denial
of his benefits violated his rights to freedom of religion and equal
protection. 4 The Supreme Court upheld district court jurisdiction
over these constitutional challenges despite a statutory provision
expressly prohibiting any judicial review of the Veteran's Ad-
ministration's decisions." The Robison Court reasoned that
117. Id.
118. Id. The court concluded that
Thunder Basin may have the merits of its claims decided without risking
substantial daily penalties. After receiving a citation it can abate the violation
by complying, while proceeding with the appeals process. Alternatively, if
plaintiff chooses not to comply with an MSHA order, apparently it may still
avoid risking daily penalties by pursuing an expedited hearing that requires only
four days notice.
Id. at 976 (citations omitted).
119. Id.
120. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 483-84 (1991); Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592, 604-05 (1988); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974); see also
Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. L. REV.
689,730-31 (1990) (noting a "superstrong presumption against preclusion of constitutional
claims"). But see Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 556 P.2d 289,291
n.2 (Cal. 1976) (recognizing the power of a state agency to determine the constitutionality
of statutes). See generally DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 89, § 17.9, at 158 (noting that the
"Court has always distinguished between judicial review of an agency action based on an
alleged violation of a statute and judicial review of an agency action based on a credible
claim that the action violates the petitioner's constitutional rights").
121. 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
122. Id. at 364.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 365 n.5, 366. The Court stressed the fact that "the Board of Veterans'
Appeals expressly disclaimed authority to decide constitutional questions." Id. at 368
(citing Appeal of Sly, Bd. Veterans' App. C-27 593 725 (May 10, 1972)).
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" '[a]djudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments
has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction of administrative
agencies.' "6
The Supreme Court in Thunder Basin only briefly addressed the
issue of administrative review of constitutional issues. It simply cited
Secretary v. Richardson,"z a Mine Commission decision, for the
proposition that an administrative commission was capable of
reviewing constitutional issues.'" Richardson presented the Com-
mission's persuasive argument for the administrative review of
constitutional claims:29 Congress mandated that the Commission
have primary adjudicative jurisdiction over any conflicts arising under
the Mine Act," ° including questions of fact, law, and policy.'
Based on this mandate, the Commission argued:
A necessary concomitant of that authority is that this
Commission, whose members are sworn to uphold the
Constitution, must make its determinations in accordance
with the Constitution.... We believe that we cannot
properly fulfill our duty to interpret the law and to apply it
constitutionally, without at the same time deciding whether
the law or a portion of it conforms to the Constitution.
Richardson distinguished the Mine Commission from other
administrative agencies to which Congress generally had denied the
authority to rule on constitutional issues. 33 The opinion suggested
that by being "vested with solely adjudicative responsibilities," the
Commission avoids the potential bias found in agencies that "simul-
taneously regulate, prosecute and adjudicate."" The Thunder
Basin Court expressly adopted this portion of the Commission's
126. Id. at 368 (quoting Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968)
(Harlan, J., concurring in result)).
127. 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. 8 (1981), affd on other grounds, 689 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied sub nom. Richardson v. Donovan, 461 U.S. 928 (1983).
128. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780 (citing Richardson).
129. Richardson, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 18-21; see also Note, The Authority of Ad-
ministrative Agencies to Consider the Constitutionality of Statutes, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1682,
1706-07 (1977) (exploring the constitutional arguments for and against the traditional rule
disfavoring agency review of constitutional questions and advocating flexibility in allowing
such review).
130. Richardson, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 18 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 823(d) (1988)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 18-19.
133. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (discussing general practice of
extracting constitutional claims from the administrative decision-making process and
subjecting them to judicial review).
134. Richardson, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 19.
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rationale, stating that prohibiting agency review of constitutional
issues was "of less consequence where, as here, the reviewing body is
not the agency itself but an independent commission established
exclusively to adjudicate Mine Act disputes."'3 Further promoting
its independent nature, the Commission pointed out that qualified
members are appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate.'36 In Richardson, the Commission also maintained
that the statutory provisions describing Commission proceedings
provide adequate due process.' 37  In sum, the Commission con-
tended that as an adjudicative body with the authority to consider due
process claims and other constitutional challenges to administrative
actions, it is competent to address constitutional claims against the
"underlying statute, especially where ... review in a United States
court of appeals is available.' 38
Additionally, the Commission offered several policy reasons for
its claimed jurisdiction over constitutional questions. It maintained
that "efficient and expeditious resolution of constitutional issues" is
possible under Commission review, just as with the disposition of
nonconstitutional claims. 39  The Commission also stated that its
construction of a factual record on all claims reduces litigation
expenses and delays in resolving disputes."4
In Thunder Basin, the Supreme Court agreed with the Tenth
Circuit's conclusion that the Mine Act's review procedure is "ad-
equate and exclusive."' 4' However, this holding could only be
reached by overcoming the established presumption of reviewability
inherent in all administrative acts.42 The Court rejected the "clear
135. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780.
136. Richardson, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 19 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 823 (1988)). The five
members of the National Labor Relations Board are also "appointed by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate." 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1988). Additionally, the
three members of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission are appointed
in the same manner. Id. § 661.
137. Richardson, 3 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 20. The Commission argued that the statute
provided components of due process that include granting of notice and an opportunity
to be heard, the right to counsel, a resulting "reasoned opinion" rendered by an
administrative law judge, the right to Commission review, and the availability of judicial
review in the courts of appeals. Id.
138. lId
139. Id. at 21.
140. Id.
141. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 774, 782.
142. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). In Abbott, the Supreme
Court announced a presumption of reviewability of administrative actions, declaring that
"only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent
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and convincing" standard for evidence of legislative intent to preclude
judicial review that had been articulated in Abbott Laboratories,"'
and instead adopted the "fairly discernible from the statutory scheme"
standard instituted in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute.144
Under the Block standard, the statutory purpose, language,
context, and history comprise the "statutory scheme" from which
courts should assess reviewability.' 45 In Thunder Basin the Court
paid particular attention to the Mine Act's legislative history,'4'
should the courts restrict access to judicial review." Id. at 140 (quoting Rusk v. Cort, 369
U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)). The Court based this presumption on the Administrative
Procedure Act (A.P.A.) which provides that all administrative actions are subject to
judicial review "except to the extent that 1) statutes preclude judicial review; or 2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1988). See generally
Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Presumption of Reviewability: A Study in Canonical
Construction and Its Consequences, 45 VAND. L. REv. 743, 751-65 (1992) (describing the
genesis and continued existence of the presumption of reviewability); Donald M. Levy, Jr.
& Debra Jean Duncan, Note, Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking and
Enforcement Discretion: The Effect of a Presumption of Unreviewability, 55 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 596, 597-604 (1987) (sketching the development of the presumption of
reviewability of administrative action under the common law and its codification in the
A.P.A., pinpointing the § 701(a)(2) exception for action committed to agency discretion
by law); Robert F. Hillard, Note, Statutory Preclusion of Judicial Review Under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 1976 DUKE L.. 431, 433-49 (examining the A.P.A.'s
statutory preclusion doctrine and exploring whether preclusion must be evident on the
statute's face, and if not, what sort of showing is necessary to overcome the A.P.A.'s
presumption of reviewability).
143. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 778-79 (distinguishing Abbott); see also supra note
142.
144. ld at 776 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (1984));
see supra note 39 and accompanying text. One scholar maintains that "[a]lthough the
Court ostensibly clarified the [Abbott] clear and convincing evidence standard in the
context of preclusion analysis, the Court [in deciding Block] may actually have relaxed the
standard for demonstrating congressional intent to preclude review." Cynthia Tripi,
Administrative Law: Availability of Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 729,733 n.28 (1987) (citing Rhodes v. United States, 760 F.2d 1180, 1182-
83 (11th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that the less exacting Block standard would change the
result to allow district court review)).
145. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's standard of
reviewability in Thunder Basin).
146. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Thunder Basin
Court's reliance on the Mine Act's legislative history). Justice Scalia's concurring opinion
expressed his abiding view that legislative history should not be a prominent, nor even an
existing, component of judicial evaluations of legislative intent. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct.
at 782 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). See generally Jorge
L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and Use of Legislative Histories:
A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRIcs J. 294 (1982) (analyzing the Supreme Court's
increased use of legislative history from 1938 to 1979 and providing a brief, yet useful,
review of literature on the subject); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations,
1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 385-86 (maintaining that legislative history can be, and is in fact,
misused, but is helpful when statutory language is ambiguous); Kenneth W. Starr,
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recognizing that the mining industry has a unique and lengthy history
of preventable catastrophic accidents resulting from myriad safety
violations. 47 In view of this record of noncompliance,"4 the Court
noted Congress's recognition that the search for sympathetic judges
should be narrowed by excluding district courts from the Mine Act's
review process.'49
The Court interpreted the Mine Act review scheme's silence on
pre-enforcement claims to indicate a congressional intent to include
these claims in the judicial review process expressly denoted for post-
enforcement claims.5 " Under the Mine Act, citations may be issued
for violations of "any mandatory health or safety standard, rule, order
or regulation promulgated pursuant to [the Act]."'' However, the
Mine Act only grants judicial review for challenges to Commission
Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 379 (advising use
of legislative history only as a last resort in ascertaining congressional intent because
relying on legislative history violates democratic theory and is at odds with several
practical concerns); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History
in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.
L. REV. 277,286-300 (1990) (surveying the Court's use of legislative history and concluding
that the Court has adopted a cautious approach).
147. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 777 n.12; see also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594,
605 (1981) (holding that warrantless mine inspections do not violate a mine operator's
Fourth Amendment protections, because mining is a heavily regulated industry and such
inspections are integral to protecting miners through enforcement of safety and health
standards). See generally BRArrHWAITE, supra note 3, at 2 (concluding that mine safety
enforcement laws have been a major factor in producing the dramatic improvements in
coal mine safety in the past century).
148. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 777-78; see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
149. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 778. Circuit courts, which often sit in three-judge
panels, promote consistency in applications of the same law and additionally discourage
petitioners from seeking sympathetic review. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 89, § 15.14, at
377. For a detailed analysis of which administrative actions are most effectively reviewed
by district courts, courts of appeals, or administrative review bodies, see David P. Currie
& Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1 (1975), which contrasts the efficiency and flexibility of district courts with the
quality and uniformity provided by courts of appeals. See generally CURRAN, supra note
50, at 124 (suggesting that the Mine Act review process itself, and not simply district
courts, provides coal operators with a "loophole" through which to, at least partially, evade
penalty assessments). From 1970 to 1977, the Mine Administration issued more than
704,000 citations with monetary penalties. Id. Of the $66 million assessed against mine
operators, only $29 million was recovered. Id. Five million dollars in proposed penalties
were tied up in administrative appeals, both formal and informal, and "[a]nother $5 million
in assessed penalties awaited collection in federal courts." Id.
150. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Thunder Basin
Court's reasoning behind applying the judicial review scheme to pre-enforcement
challenges).
151. 30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1988).
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orders." In Thunder Basin, the Commission had not issued an
order against Thunder Basin for violating the posting regulation. 53
The Court's interpretation suggests that administrative judicial review
procedures will be triggered for challenges, whether pre- or post-
enforcement, to any action for which a party may be issued a
citation." 4 Therefore, if a statute fails to address pre-enforcement
challenges, but includes a review process for post-enforcement or
challenges in general, the statute's review scheme will be read to
encompass pre-enforcement challenges as well.
Along with analyzing the statutory purpose, context, and
legislative history, the Court noted that the evaluation of statutory
review of judicial preclusion must also include whether an aggrieved
party is granted "meaningful review" under the statute. 5 Citing
Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans5 6 and Board of
Governors of Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial, Inc.,"7 the
Thunder Basin Court essentially established a standard for measuring
"meaningful review." ' 8 In both earlier cases the Court had held
that a district court lacked jurisdiction because the statutory review
process provided adequate means of review in federal courts of
appeals. 9 Similarly, the Court in Thunder Basin suggested that the
Mine Act scheme granting judicial review to courts of appeals, subject
152. Id. § 816(a)(1).
153. See supra text accompanying note 26 (discussing suit filed by Thunder Basin in
district court before Mine Administration issued a formal order).
154. Cf DAviS & PIERCE, supra note 89, § 18.2, at 167-68 (describing the judicial
evolution of interpreting "rules" as synonymous with "orders" when statutory language has
provided judicial review for only one). The Court's assumption of an inadvertent omission
of pre-enforcement challenges from the review process compensates for a possible
legislative drafting error. Id.; see also Investment Co. Inst. v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 551 F.2d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that "the purposes underlying
[judicial review procedures] will be best served if 'order' is interpreted to mean any agency
action capable of review on the basis of the administrative record").
155. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 776.
156. 379 U.S. 411 (1965); see supra note 41 and accompanying text.
157. 502 U.S. 32 (1991).
158. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 776.
159. MCorp, 502 U.S. at 43-44. In MCorp, a bank holding company filed for
bankruptcy and then initiated injunction proceedings in district court to enjoin continuance
of two separate administrative proceedings. Icd at 34. The statutory scheme in question
provided that a bank holding company may seek a district court injunction within ten days
of receiving a temporary order. Id. at 38. Failing this course, a final Board order may
only be reviewed in the court of appeals. Id Additionally, a statutory provision granted
the Board express authority to request a district court to enforce an order. Id.; Whitney
Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 379 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1965); see also supra note 41
(discussing Whitney).
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to subsequent Supreme Court review, does not foreclose review
altogether and therefore provides "meaningful review."'" The
Thunder Basin Court applied this standard to both statutory and
constitutional claims.161  Under the Thunder Basin analysis,
"meaningful review" never requires district court review of any claim.
Especially significant to future statutory judicial review analysis
is Thunder Basin's establishment of a clear exception to a generally
accepted presumption of review. Ordinarily, the presumption of
reviewability of administrative actions is exceedingly strong when the
actions give rise to constitutional challenges. 62 The strength of the
presumption rests on the need to preserve the constitutional
separation of powers."6  However, the Court in Thunder Basin
found evidence in the Mine Act sufficient to overcome the
presumption.' The Court's pronouncement that the "rule is not
mandatory" permits the Mine Commission to decide constitutional
claims,"6 diminishing the strength of the reviewability presumption
and indicating that the right to judicial review of constitutional
challenges is not absolute. The Court's recognition of the Mine
Commission's authority to decide constitutional issues extinguishes a
mechanism by which coal mine operators might attempt pre-enfor-
cement review in district courts.
At first glance, the Thunder Basin Court's expressed exception
to the general rule requiring judicial review of constitutional issues
swings wide a door, welcoming any administrative agency to engage
in constitutional adjudication. The Court noted little more than that
"the rule is not mandatory.'" However, the Court's exception is
circumscribed by its reasoning. The Court asserted that the rule need
not apply in this case because the constitutional review would be
160. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780.
161. Id.
162. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. Er AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.2, at
128 (1985); supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text (discussing Robison and the strong
reviewability presumption surrounding constitutional claims). Judicial dicta and scholarly
analysis generally comprise the few statements confirming the existence of a presumption
of reviewability of constitutional issues. PIERCE ET AL., supra § 5.2, at 128-29. This tenet
of statutory interpretation has been so generally accepted and widely assumed that courts
have seldom seen the need to articulate it as a principle. id.
163. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 162, § 5.2, at 128.
164. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780; see also supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text
(discussing dissolution of the presumption in Thunder Basin).
165. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 780. This authority bestowed by the Court includes
entertaining constitutional challenges to Mine Administration action as well as challenges
to the enabling Mine Act. Id.
166. Id.
2008 [Vol. 73
MINE ACT REVIEW SCHEME
conducted by an "independent commission," established solely to
adjudicate Mine Act claims, which previously had addressed
constitutional challenges. 67
Although the Thunder Basin Court admitted that its decision on
preclusion grounds did not necessitate addressing Thunder Basin's due
process claim, the Court evaluated and dispensed with the claim
nonetheless." s  In the case below, the Tenth Circuit noted how
easily litigants could frame their claims in constitutional terms in an
attempt to obtain district court review.69 By addressing the merits
of Thunder Basin's due process claim, the Court frustrated similar
future attempts to access district courts through claims that the Mine
Act's review scheme is an unconstitutional infringement on due
process rights. The Thunder Basin Court established grounds, albeit
in dicta, upon which the Mine Commission could decide comparable
challenges in like manner while citing the Supreme Court as
167. Ild; see also supra notes 61 and 110 (discussing previous Commission review of
constitutional challenges).
168. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 781-82; see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
169. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Martin, 969 F.2d 970, 975 (10th Cir. 1992), affd sub
nor., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 114 S. Ct. 771 (1994); see supra note 115 and
accompanying text. For example, Thunder Basin voiced its anxieties over union attempts
to organize its employees in terms of a Fifth Amendment due process violation. The
company argued that it would suffer irreparable harm if union members serving as
representatives were allowed access to its property and records. Id. at 972. This
apprehension of union influence appears to be the paramount impetus behind Thunder
Basin's desire to frustrate UMWA access as representatives. The company's petition for
certiorari emphasized the UMWA's unsuccessful attempts to unionize its employees,
describing the designation of UMWA members as representatives as merely a new tactic
in its strategy to unionize Thunder Basin employees. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3-4,
Thunder Basin, (No. 92-896). Additionally, a brief filed in support of Thunder Basin
described the nonmonetary costs to Thunder Basin of allowing union members access as
representatives. Brief for Amici Curiae of American Mining Congress and Nat'l Coal
Ass'n in support of Petitioner at 8, Thunder Basin (No. 92-896). Arguing that due process
prohibited the imposition of such costs as would be incurred if district court pre-
enforcement injunctive relief were denied, the brief stated that union member access would
alter "the delicate labor-management balance that federal labor law seeks to preserve."
Id Previously, in Utah Power & Light Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 897 F.2d 447, 452 (10th
Cir. 1990), the Tenth Circuit held that a representative did not have to be an employee of
the represented mine. The court recognized that the holding created potential for abuse
by unions seeking access to nonunion mine operations but declared that the operator could
remedy discovered abuses on an individual basis by following the Mine Act review
procedures. Id. The Thunder Basin Court adopted this case-by-case approach to
alleviating mine operator concerns about unlimited union access. Thunder Basin, 114 S.
Ct. at 781. The organized labor subtext of this case has led to at least one pronouncement
of Thunder Basin as a "victory for coal labor." Ruling in Safety Act Case is Victory for
Coal Labor, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Jan. 21, 1994, at B1l.
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authority.7 ' The Court effectively established the constitutionality
of the Mine Act's review scheme, rendering it virtually impervious to
future due process claims.
Thunder Basin's holding that the Mine Act precludes district
court review of Mine Administration actions was an inevitable
resolution of the Sixth and Tenth Circuit courts' split of opinion.71
The Sixth Circuit's contention that the Mine Act did not expressly
preclude district court review had less support in accepted
authority."v However, that court correctly applied the generally
accepted principle that constitutional issues are beyond agency
review." As the Tenth Circuit, and later the Supreme Court,
acknowledged, the Mine Act's legislative history reveals Congress's
unique concerns about enforcement delays caused partly by access to
district court review.' Noting that delays in mine safety enfor-
cement can lead to serious accidents and fatalities, the Tenth Circuit
and the Supreme Court recognized that Congress intended to
foreclose district court review of Mine Administration actions.7
5
On this basis, Thunder Basin also granted the Mine Administration
the exceptional authority to review constitutional issues.
176
In predicting the reach of Thunder Basin, the most obvious
candidate for preclusion of district court review in favor of agency
determinations of constitutional claims appears to be the Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)." 7 The OSH Act bears a striking
resemblance to the Mine Act in purpose, judicial review procedure,
and commission function. The OSH Act's stated purpose is to secure
"safe and healthful working conditions."'7" The judicial review
scheme established by the OSH Act directs challenges to the United
170. Thunder Basin, 114 S. Ct. at 781-82.
171. Previously, both the Sixth and Tenth Circuits had considered precisely the same
issue, reaching contrary conclusions. See supra notes 82-119 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (noting the Sixth Circuit's conclusion was
contrary to general statutory interpretation principles).
173. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's
evaluation of Mine Act's legislative history); supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court's evaluation of Mine Act's legislative history).
175. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth Circuit's
evaluation of Mine Act's legislative history); supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text
(discussing the Supreme Court's evaluation of Mine Act's legislative history).
176. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
177. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
178. Id. § 651(b).
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States courts of appeals, subject to Supreme Court review.1 79
Furthermore, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion is endowed with purely adjudicatory powers,"s thus substan-
tially meeting the three Thunder Basin criteria for allowing agency
review of constitutional issues. 8'
Despite similarities between the Mine Act and other review
schemes, Thunder Basin may be limited in application by its distinct
facts. Mining is an extremely dangerous activity,ls and as such, has
already been excepted by the Supreme Court from the Fourth
Amendment's customary warrant requirement for inspections."l In
turn, the Court has established that the Mine Act "applies to
industrial activity with a notorious history of serious accidents and
unhealthful conditions."' '  Therefore, Thunder Basin may be
distinguishable based on the heavily regulated industry that it
involved. However, it may still be evoked in OSH Act cases. The
OSH Act echoes the Mine Act's purpose in protecting workers by
regulating health and safety standards. In such cases, streamlined
enforcement procedures enhance compliance.
179. I& § 660(a); see also Sharp Drilling Co. v. Donovan, 528 F. Supp. 390,391 (W.D.
Okla. 1981) (granting motion for dismissal for lack of district court subject matter
jurisdiction in OSHA case).
180. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(3) (1988).
181. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 127-35 and
accompanying text (discussing Richardson, which the Supreme Court cited to support the
Mine Commission's authority to adjudicate constitutional challenges).
182. See J. Davitt McAteer, Accidehts: Causation and Responsibility in Law, A Focus
on Coal Mining, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 921, 932-34 (1981). See generally CURRAN, supra note
50, at 49-139 (maintaining that major coal mining disasters have been a partial impetus for
health and safety legislation throughout the 20th Century).
183. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (declaring that the "mining industry
is among the most hazardous in the country"). From 1989 to 1994, Kentucky led the
nation in mining fatalities with 113, followed by West Virginia with 84 and Virginia with
39. Joseph S. Stroud, Citations Rose Sharply At Mines After Fatal Accidents, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Feb. 26,1995, at A12. During the same period, Pennsylvania recorded
24 mine fatalities, while Colorado and North Dakota recorded 5 each. Id.
184. Id. at 603. As recently as 1984, 27 miners died in a coal mine fire in Wilberg,
Utah. CURRAN, supra note 50, at 171. The mine, owned by Utah Power and Light
Company and operated by the Emery Mining Corporation, had a history of health and
safety violations. Id. The Mine Administration conducted a six-week inspection at the
mine, concluding the day before the disaster. Id. The Administration did not issue any
citations for Mine Act violations until after the two-year investigation that followed the
fire. Id. at 174. These violations were determined to have contributed significantly to the
cause and magnitude of the fire. Id. at 173. That the conditions remained unchanged in
violation of federal mine safety and health regulations even after a six-week inspection is
incomprehensible. See id. at 174.
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Undoubtedly, Thunder Basin benefits workers and has decidedly
pro-union undertones. Factually, this case illustrates Thunder Basin's
attempt to prohibit entirely union members' access to its nonunion
mine by judicially preventing union members from serving as Mine
Act "representatives" for inspections." Thunder Basin needed
access to the district court because the Tenth Circuit already had
ruled that "representatives" need not be employees of the mine. 6
To establish district court jurisdiction, Thunder Basin challenged the
constitutionality of the Mine Act's entire review scheme, but the
Court ruled that the Mine Commission has authority to adjudicate
such issues. The Court ensured that mine operators could not
circumvent unfavorable Commission decisions simply by invoking
district court jurisdiction. Thus, the Thunder Basin Court elevated the
interests of miners by undermining mine operator's attempts to use
district courts to evade the Mine Act review process.
JoY L. GRAGG
185. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text (establishing Thunder Basin's factual
circumstances).
186. See supra note 169 (detailing this labor subtext).
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